# PQ Crypta

> Post-quantum cryptography, run in production rather than described. The site is
> backed by a self-operated edge: an HTTP/3 + QUIC proxy with server-side Encrypted
> Client Hello, 35 continuously verified encryption engines, and a TLS fingerprint
> directory built from traffic this edge actually sees.

Operated by Allan Riddel. Contact: contact@pqcrypta.com

Most of what is here is measurement, not marketing. Where a page states a number,
that number came from the running system and is regenerated on a timer.

## Datasets (machine-readable, no auth, CORS open)

- [JA4/JA3 fingerprint directory — JSON](https://pqcrypta.com/ja4/api.php): Every
  fingerprint in the directory, curated and observed, with each JA4 decoded into the
  handshake properties it encodes and each JA3 decoded back into named IANA cipher
  suites, extensions and groups. Supports `?fp=<hash>` for one fingerprint plus its
  JA4_c family, `?class=`/`?tier=`/`?q=` filters, and `?format=csv`.
- [Fingerprint directory — CSV](https://pqcrypta.com/ja4/api.php?format=csv): The
  same data flat, one row per fingerprint.
- [Per-fingerprint pages](https://pqcrypta.com/ja4/): Each fingerprint also has a
  human-readable page at `/ja4/fp/<hash>/`, listed in
  [sitemap-ja4.xml](https://pqcrypta.com/sitemaps/sitemap-ja4.xml).

## What is distinctive here

- [JA4 fingerprint directory](https://pqcrypta.com/ja4/): Curated classifications
  next to fingerprints observed live, named from the User-Agents seen on their
  requests. Shows how many distinct JA3 hashes each JA4 absorbs — the busiest entry
  is one headless Chrome build spread across 4,104 JA3s, which is the concrete
  argument for JA4 over JA3.
- [HTTP/3 client conformance suite](https://pqcrypta.com/conformance/): A public
  service that makes the server misbehave on purpose — reserved frame types, a
  duplicated SETTINGS identifier, a control stream opening with the wrong frame
  — so a client library can find out how it copes. 51 tests, each citing the RFC
  clause it exercises, with a machine-readable catalogue at
  [conformance.pqcrypta.com/catalog.json](https://conformance.pqcrypta.com/catalog.json)
  and JSON reports for CI. Nothing else public tests HTTP/3 *clients* this way;
  offering it requires a forked QUIC stack.
- [HTTP/3 client matrix](https://pqcrypta.com/conformance/matrix/): The same 59
  tests run weekly against twelve independent implementations — curl (ngtcp2),
  aioquic, Chromium QUICHE, quic-go, Cloudflare quiche, neqo, picoquic, ngtcp2
  driven directly, LiteSpeed lsquic, Alibaba xquic, .NET's HttpClient over
  msquic and quico (QUIC and HTTP/3 in pure JavaScript for Node.js) — so the
  results are comparative rather than self-reported. A thirteenth,
  `quinn`, runs on the same stack the suite is built on; it is published in full
  as a self-test and excluded from every comparative figure, because a suite that
  ranks its own implementation is scoring its own game however plainly it says so.
  Clients are listed by how much of the catalogue they answered rather than by
  pass rate: a rate over 30 conclusive results is not comparable with one over 54,
  and sorting by percentage alone puts the thinnest wrapper at the top. Verdicts are
  per client, and there are two states besides pass and fail. `unsupported` means
  the client said it does not do this — by what it advertised, or by refusing
  outright — which is an answer about the client. `inconclusive` means the suite
  failed to measure, which is a defect in the suite and is tracked as one. A
  failure is never inferred from silence: it requires positive evidence the client
  read the anomaly, and where that evidence is available the suite now goes and
  gets it rather than reporting a shrug.
- [Post-quantum certificates, measured](https://pqcrypta.com/conformance/post-quantum-certificates/):
  the two halves of the PQC migration are nowhere near each other, and the numbers
  come from the same run as the matrix. Eight of the twelve measured
  implementations complete a hybrid X25519MLKEM768 key exchange — three others
  offer no post-quantum key share at all, so they never reach the port — and three
  can receive an ML-DSA-87 certificate chain. The rest never see it — their `signature_algorithms` does not name
  ML-DSA-87, so the handshake fails on the server side before the chain is sent,
  which is a failure mode no server configuration can fix. Not a defect report:
  no RFC requires post-quantum certificate support, and the test is graded
  accordingly.
- [Conformance client directory](https://pqcrypta.com/conformance/clients/) and
  [anomaly directory](https://pqcrypta.com/conformance/tests/): the same corpus as
  one page per fact rather than one grid — a page per implementation
  (`/conformance/client/<name>/`), a page per deliberate violation
  (`/conformance/test/<id>/`), and a page per individual verdict
  (`/conformance/result/<client>/<test>/`), each naming the RFC clause it was judged
  against and linking to both its parents. 785 addressable pages. Per-client badges
  for a README at `/conformance/badge/<client>.svg`, scored over conclusive results
  only — pass plus fail — because neither an unsupported capability nor a failed
  measurement is a judgement against the client.
- [Where HTTP/3 clients fail](https://pqcrypta.com/conformance/findings/): every
  measured failure, grouped by the clause rather than by the implementation. The
  grouping is the point: `h-push-promise-unsolicited` is failed the same way by
  quinn, aioquic and Chromium — three independent teams reading RFC 9114 §7.2.5
  and all reporting H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED where the document requires H3_ID_ERROR —
  which is evidence about the clause, not three unrelated bugs. Specification
  violations, not vulnerabilities, and the page says so.
- [Your own handshake](https://pqcrypta.com/handshake/): Computes the visitor's own
  JA4 from their ClientHello and links it into the directory, and says whether the
  key exchange that carried the request was post-quantum or classical.
- [Public MASQUE relay](https://pqcrypta.com/masque/): A free CONNECT-UDP endpoint
  over HTTP/3, RFC 9298, with a standalone reference client. There is almost
  nowhere else to point a CONNECT-UDP implementation at a live relay.
- [HTTP/3 and QUIC scanner](https://pqcrypta.com/http3-quic/): Grades a domain's
  HTTP/3 deployment. 614 domains scanned so far; 401 of them grade F. The page is a
  client of a JSON API anyone can call: POST /http3-scanner/scan (API key, X-API-Key
  header) returns the full result object for one origin, GET /http3-scanner/corpus
  and GET /http3-scanner/stats are open. All three are machine-readable, need no
  browser User-Agent. GET /http3-scanner/timeline?domain=<host> returns the
  per-domain history of what changed between observations. Every panel on the
  page is rendered from one of these four. See
  https://api.pqcrypta.com/http3-scanner/corpus.
- [Certificate compression](https://pqcrypta.com/http3-quic/): RFC 8879 is live on this
  origin — the chain goes out at 2,376 bytes instead of 3,435, roughly offsetting what
  the ML-KEM key share adds. The scanner reads which algorithm any origin compressed
  with; of six large sites sampled, only one did.
- [Encrypted Client Hello](https://pqcrypta.com/quic-hardening/): Four apex domains
  share one ECHConfig on one IP, which is a working multi-domain anonymity set run
  outside a large CDN.
- [Cryptographic discovery agent](https://pqcrypta.com/discovery/): Inventories
  cryptographic assets across nine surfaces, runs air-gapped, and produces CycloneDX
  1.6 CBOMs. Offline and online scoring are byte-identical.
- [Health of every engine](https://pqcrypta.com/health/): All 35 encryption engines
  proving a full key-generation, encryption and decryption roundtrip on a schedule.

## Protocol and cryptography writing

- [QUIC whitepaper](https://pqcrypta.com/quic-whitepaper/)
- [HTTP/3 whitepaper](https://pqcrypta.com/http3-whitepaper/): A scroll-driven replay
  of one real scan.
- [Multipath QUIC](https://pqcrypta.com/multipath-whitepaper/)
- [QUIC hardening](https://pqcrypta.com/quic-hardening/)
- [HTTP request smuggling](https://pqcrypta.com/http-smuggling/)
- [Traffic analysis](https://pqcrypta.com/traffic-analysis/)
- [Post-quantum TLS tickets](https://pqcrypta.com/pqc-tickets/)
- [Encrypted sharing design](https://pqcrypta.com/share-whitepaper/)

## Tools

- [Encryption](https://pqcrypta.com/encryption/): 35 algorithms; Password Mode and
  fourteen key algorithms run in the browser (keys and plaintext stay on the device),
  the rest on the API over TLS 1.3 with X25519MLKEM768.
- [Encrypted share](https://pqcrypta.com/share/): Nested dual-KEM, HQC-256 over
  ML-KEM-1024, so both must break.
- [CBOM builder](https://pqcrypta.com/cbom/)
- [PQC readiness](https://pqcrypta.com/pqc-ready/)
- [Entropy audit](https://pqcrypta.com/entropy/)
- [Compression](https://pqcrypta.com/compression/)
- [Speed test](https://pqcrypta.com/speedtest/): Over WebTransport.
- [Benchmarks](https://pqcrypta.com/benchmark/) and
  [analysis](https://pqcrypta.com/benchmark-analysis/)

## Optional

- [Sitemap index](https://pqcrypta.com/sitemap.xml)
- [Security contact](https://pqcrypta.com/.well-known/security.txt)
- [Fun and visual experiments](https://pqcrypta.com/fun/)
- [Music](https://pqcrypta.com/music/)