q13d0311h3_55b375c5d22e_e3b8e4ce5af0
Presented a User-Agent we cannot attribute to a known client.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0311h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
e3b8e4ce5af0
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 11
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 11
-
server_name -
status_request -
supported_groups -
ec_point_formats -
signature_algorithms -
renegotiation_info -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
signed_certificate_timestamp -
supported_versions -
key_share -
quic_transport_parameters
Named groups 4
-
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1 -
secp521r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867,0-5-10-11-13-65281-16-18-43-51-57,29-23-24-25,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 3
- First seen
- 2026-08-24 01:36 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-08-24 03:05 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
quic-go-HTTP/33×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.