PQ Crypta

Post-quantum cryptography, HTTP/3 and DNS

689 of 691 endpoints healthy checked

Post-quantum cryptography and HTTP/3, from your inventory to the edge.

Discover every key, certificate and weak-crypto call across your estate. Enforce post-quantum TLS at the edge, over HTTP/3 and QUIC, with an open-source proxy built for both. Carry post-quantum protection into your own applications with 35 algorithms built on NIST's standards. Then measure it: on the web, on your own connection, and in the client libraries that speak HTTP/3.

Inventory your estate Grade your website

Free to use, no account needed. API documentation · the proxy is open source on GitHub.

Your connection to this page Classical key exchange
Your browser pqcrypta.com edge ClientHello · key_share x25519 ServerHello · key_share x25519 Certificate · CertificateVerify · Finished Finished HTTP/2 application data
Key exchange
x25519 Classical
Transport
HTTP/2 over TCP this edge answers HTTP/3 too; a browser moves to it once it has read the Alt-Svc
TLS
TLS 1.3 · TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Encrypted Client Hello
ECH not offered your client sent the server name in clear
Your JA4
t13d1011h2_61a7ad8aa9b6_3fcd1a44f3e3
Read by the edge from this request Handshake Mirror
Algorithms 35 33 post-quantum, 2 classical API endpoints 691 689 healthy at the last check Sites on ML-KEM 71% 619 of 878 sites accept ML-KEM Sites on HTTP/3 31.5% 218 of 691 negotiate it DNS queries, 24 h 251,131 18,578 over encrypted transports TLS fingerprints 9,365 observed on 5 edges, decoded Conformance tests 59 adversarial HTTP/3, QUIC and TLS Ledger height 41,216 4 validators, ML-DSA-87 signed

The federal clock

Executive Order 14412 and OMB memo M-26-15

Phase one of the federal migration is an inventory of cryptographic systems. Next: Contractor FAR rule; CMVP revised for PQC, December 19, 2026, in 39 days.

  1. Executive Order 14412 signed Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks
  2. OMB memo M-26-15 Phase one, 2026–2027: inventory cryptographic systems
  3. Agency PQC Migration Plans due To OMB, 120 days after M-26-15
  4. Next · 39 days Contractor FAR rule; CMVP revised for PQC 180 days after the order
  5. CBOM minimum elements CISA and NIST guidance, 270 days after the order
  6. Post-quantum key establishment Federal agencies, under the order
  7. Post-quantum digital signatures Federal agencies, under the order

Start the inventory with the Discovery Agent

The platform

One stack, three layers

Find the cryptography you run, put post-quantum key exchange in front of it, and carry post-quantum protection into the applications behind it.

Discover

Know every cryptographic asset you run

Inventory comes first: the federal mandate makes it phase one, and nothing can be migrated that has not been found.

Discovery capabilities

Enforce

Post-quantum TLS at the edge

Put post-quantum key exchange in front of what you already run, without touching the services behind it.

Proxy whitepaper

Carry

Post-quantum protection in your applications

Encrypt, sign, share and attest with the algorithms NIST standardised, over one API or in the browser.

API documentation

QUIC & HTTP/3

The transport, built and measured

A post-quantum handshake rides QUIC as often as TCP. PQ Crypta runs its own HTTP/3 edge, grades the web's, and holds the client libraries that speak it to the RFCs.

One lost packet
HTTP/2 over TCP one ordered byte streama lost packet holds every stream behind itHTTP/3 over QUIC every stream its ownit holds only its own streamyour connection

The same nine packets of three requests, one of them lost on the way. TCP hands over one ordered byte stream, so every request waits for the retransmission; QUIC orders each stream on its own (RFC 9000). Measure it on your own link with the speed test and the telemetry wall.

The web on HTTP/3

31.5% of 691 sites negotiate HTTP/3

  1. 0-RTT resumption 90 37%
  2. QPACK dynamic table 104 43%
  3. Connection migration allowed 124 51%
  4. HTTP/3 datagrams 55 23%
  5. QUIC v2 offered (RFC 9369) 30 12%
  6. WebTransport in SETTINGS 6 2.5%
  7. Multipath QUIC 0 0%

Of the 243 sites whose QUIC handshake completed, as the Post-Quantum Web Analyzer last measured them; each figure is over the sites where it could be measured. CC BY 4.0.

59 adversarial tests, 12 HTTP/3 client libraries
  1. ngtcp2 C 55/59
  2. quico JavaScript 57/59
  3. chromium C++ 53/59
  4. neqo Rust 53/59
  5. picoquic C 42/59
  6. quic-go Go 48/59
  7. curl C 37/59
  8. quiche Rust 47/59
  9. lsquic C 47/59
  10. xquic C 44/59
  11. aioquic Python 44/59
  12. msquic C# 36/59

passed failed unsupported, by the client's own account inconclusive · the whole matrix

Post-quantum DNS

The lookup before the handshake, encrypted and signed

Every visit starts with a DNS lookup, and on most of the web it still crosses the network in the clear. PQ Crypta runs its own authoritative name servers: every one answers over DNS over QUIC, DNS over TLS and DNS over HTTPS (HTTP/2 and HTTP/3), each with a post-quantum key exchange, and all 5 of its zones are DNSSEC-signed. Our own analyzer measures them the way it measures any domain.

Our name servers, as the analyzer measured them Scan pqcrypta.com yourself
Each name server over each encrypted transport: the key exchange its handshake used and the time to an answer, and the RFC checks it passed
Name server DNS over QUICRFC 9250 DNS over TLSRFC 7858 DNS over HTTPS, HTTP/2RFC 8484 DNS over HTTPS, HTTP/3RFC 8484 RFC checkspassed · failed
ns1.pqcrypta.com X25519 + ML-KEM-768 95 ms X25519 + ML-KEM-768 95 ms ML-KEM-1024 22 ms ML-KEM-1024 42 ms 63 passed 0 failed
ns2.pqcrypta.com X25519 + ML-KEM-768 89 ms X25519 + ML-KEM-768 185 ms ML-KEM-1024 17 ms ML-KEM-1024 24 ms 63 passed 0 failed
ns3.pqcrypta.com X25519 + ML-KEM-768 76 ms X25519 + ML-KEM-768 138 ms ML-KEM-1024 13 ms ML-KEM-1024 13 ms 63 passed 0 failed
ns4.pqcrypta.com X25519 + ML-KEM-768 155 ms X25519 + ML-KEM-768 206 ms ML-KEM-1024 114 ms ML-KEM-1024 119 ms 63 passed 0 failed
  • DNSSEC from the root . → com. → pqcrypta.com., every signature verified by the scanner itself
  • The same signed zone everywhere 24 answers: 1 key set, 1 serial
  • Denial of existence NSEC3 without extra iterations or salt (RFC 9276)
  • ZONEMD a SHA-384 digest of the whole zone, verified by every server on every transfer (RFC 8976)
  • Discovery record each server names its transports in _dns SVCB: dot, doq, h2, h3 (RFC 9461)
  • Certificates by address each one also names its server's addresses, for a resolver that knows only those (RFC 9525 §6.4)
  • 0-RTT a query in early data is answered; an update in early data is held back (RFC 9250 §4.5)
  • Scores privacy 100%, resolver compatibility 100% on every server

Scanned by the Post-Quantum Web Analyzer (probe 2026.11.02.3). Each server is asked for the zone over every transport on a new connection, so each time includes the handshake whose key exchange its cell names; 252 RFC checks ran across the 4 servers.

One lookup, end to end
. (root)KSK 38696 · RSA/SHA-256✓com.KSK 19718 · ECDSA P-256✓DS 19718pqcrypta.com.KSK 29714 · ECDSA P-256✓DS 29714Resolvervalidatingchecks every signature from the root downanswer validatedName serversns1ns2ns3ns4authoritativeDNS over QUICX25519 + ML-KEM-768DNS over TLSX25519 + ML-KEM-768DNS over HTTPS, HTTP/2ML-KEM-1024DNS over HTTPS, HTTP/3ML-KEM-1024Hidden signersigns every zone · ECDSA P-256zone transfers to ns2, ns3, ns4 over QUICto ns1 over TCP, on its host . (root)KSK 38696✓com.KSK 19718✓pqcrypta.com.KSK 29714✓Resolvervalidatingvalidates from the rootanswervalidatedServersns1ns2ns3ns4authoritativeDoQX25519 + ML-KEM-768DoTX25519 + ML-KEM-768DoH/2ML-KEM-1024DoH/3ML-KEM-1024Hidden signersigns every zonezone ns2, ns3, ns4: QUICns1: TCP, same host

A resolver asks over each encrypted transport and gets a signed answer, then checks it against the chain of trust from the root's key down to the zone's. Underneath, a hidden signer that no resolver can reach signs every zone and hands the servers each change. Every label is from the measurement above and the servers' own logs.

What they answer By the hour

251,131 queries in the last 24 hours, 4,821,143 since 23 Oct

4 Novqueries per hour, by transport10 Nov 23:00 UTC

  • UDP 186,376
  • TCP 46,177
  • DNS over TLS 5,389
  • DNS over QUIC 5,171
  • DNS over HTTPS 8,018

The servers' own counts over the last day; no name and no address is kept. 7.4% came over an encrypted transport. The counts include our own monitoring, which asks every address over every transport every five minutes; every DNS over HTTPS request was one of ours.

The web's name servers

1.7% of 1,510 name servers answer any encrypted DNS

  1. DNS over TLS 25 1.7%
  2. DNS over QUIC 8 0.5%
  3. DNS over HTTPS 6 0.4%
  4. Post-quantum key exchange 17 1.1%
  5. RFC 9461 discovery record 3 0.2%
  6. DNSSEC-signed zone 166 24.5%

Every name server of the 677 domains the Post-Quantum Web Analyzer has scanned, asked over each transport; DNSSEC per zone. Our own servers are held out. CC BY 4.0.

The web today

How much of the web already speaks post-quantum?

The scanner's directory, step by step: 878 sites, each at its latest scan, measured between November 1 and November 10, 2026, our own domains left out.

71% accept ML-KEM

A site that accepts a standard ML-KEM group can keep a recorded session out of a quantum computer's reach, if the client asks.

  1. Domains measured 878 100%
  2. Negotiates TLS 1.3 785 89%
  3. Accepts a standard ML-KEM group 619 71%
  4. Gives a browser ML-KEM B 617 70%
  5. and TLS 1.3 only A 37 4.2%
  6. and insists on it, no Kyber draft A+ 19 2.2%

From the PQC Readiness Scanner's directory, licensed CC BY 4.0.

Grade your own site

Running now

The platform, live

Everything on this page runs here, in production, on the same stack you would deploy.

Health check 689 of 691 healthy Every engine generates keys, encrypts and decrypts; every endpoint answers. Last run .
Attestation ledger connecting web1 api3 mail fortress 41,216 latest block Tendermint BFT among 4 proof-of-authority validators over QUIC: a block is final once 3 sign it with ML-DSA-87, and 1 can fail. Open the ledger.
35 engines, one API
Core Classical Hybrid Post-Quantum ML-KEM-1024 Multi-Algorithm
Multi-KEM and Layered Multi-KEM Multi-KEM Triple Quad-Layer PQ3 Stack Lattice-Code Hybrid
Max Secure Max Secure Lightweight Max Secure Pure PQ Max Secure Hybrid Transition Max Secure Stateless Max Secure Crypto-Agile Max Secure PQC + ZK
FN-DSA FN-DSA 512 Compact FN-DSA 1024 Security FN-DSA FP-Hardened FN-DSA Dual-Signature FN-DSA Transition Stack FN-DSA ZK Stack
HQC Code-Based HQC-128 (Level 1) HQC-192 (Level 3) HQC-256 (Level 5)
FIPS-Final / ISO KEMs X25519MLKEM768 Classic McEliece 6960119 FrodoKEM-976 (Level 3) FrodoKEM-1344 (Level 5)
Experimental Quantum-Lattice-Fusion Post-ZK-Homomorphic Quantum-Resistant-Consensus Entropy-Orchestrated AI-Synthesized-Crypto-Agile
Password-Based Password Classical
Each dot is an engine, grouped by family; point at one for its key exchange, signatures and cipher. Try them in the browser.

Measure it yourself

Free tools, no account

Each one runs against the live system: your browser, this edge, or any domain you name.

Open source

Read the code that serves this page

PQCrypta/pqcrypta-proxy

The post-quantum HTTP/3 reverse proxy: QUIC, WebTransport, MASQUE, hybrid ML-KEM, post-quantum ECH, JA3/JA4 and a WAF.

Rust Apache-2.0 · Whitepaper

Research

Measured on our own edge

Whitepapers written from first-party measurements, each with the data and the method behind it.

Document security · pqpdf.com

Listed in NIST's Forensic Tool Catalog

Our sister site's PDF forensic scanner is in the U.S. government's registry of digital forensics tools. 45 free PDF tools sit beside it, server-side and without an account.

The NIST catalog pqpdf.com

Questions

Frequently asked

What is PQ Crypta?

A post-quantum cryptography platform in three layers. The Discovery Agent and dashboard find the cryptography an organisation runs and export it as a CycloneDX CBOM. PQCrypta Proxy, an open-source HTTP/3 reverse proxy, puts hybrid ML-KEM key exchange in front of existing services. An API of 35 algorithm engines carries post-quantum encryption and signatures into applications. This site is served by the proxy, and its API is the one documented here.

Why migrate to post-quantum cryptography now?

Traffic recorded today can be decrypted once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists: the attack known as harvest now, decrypt later. Executive Order 14412 sets the federal deadlines, post-quantum key establishment by December 31, 2030 and digital signatures by December 31, 2031, and OMB memo M-26-15 makes an inventory of cryptographic systems the first phase.

Where does a migration start?

With an inventory. The Discovery Agent is read-only and runs on Linux, Windows and macOS. It finds certificates, keys, keystores, live TLS endpoints and weak-crypto calls in source, classifies each by its NIST OID, and exports a CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM that validates against the official schema.

Which algorithms does the API offer?

35 engines, 33 of them post-quantum: ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204), SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), FN-DSA, HQC, FrodoKEM and Classic McEliece, alone and in hybrids with X25519 and Ed25519, and 2 classical engines to compare them with. The health check runs every engine end to end: key generation, encryption and decryption.

Can I call it from my own application?

Yes. The REST API at api.pqcrypta.com has 691 endpoints, 171 of them usable without a key, and the documentation gives each one's request and response. The engines also run in the browser as WebAssembly.

What does PQ Crypta offer for HTTP/3 and QUIC?

Its own HTTP/3 edge, PQCrypta Proxy, serving QUIC with post-quantum key exchange, WebTransport, MASQUE and multipath QUIC; the Post-Quantum Web Analyzer, which grades any domain's HTTP/3 and QUIC deployment and keeps a directory of 691 sites; an HTTP/3 conformance suite of 59 adversarial tests, run against 12 client libraries; a public MASQUE CONNECT-UDP relay; and a speed test and telemetry wall that measure QUIC against TCP on your own link.

Does PQ Crypta run its own DNS?

Yes: 4 authoritative name servers answer for its zones over UDP and TCP and over DNS over QUIC, DNS over TLS and DNS over HTTPS (HTTP/2 and HTTP/3), every encrypted answer with a post-quantum key exchange (X25519 + ML-KEM-768 or ML-KEM-1024). Its 5 zones are DNSSEC-signed by a hidden signer that no resolver can reach, and the Post-Quantum Web Analyzer verifies the chain from the root's key down at every scan. The same analyzer measures any domain's name servers this way.

Is the proxy open source?

Yes, under the Apache 2.0 licence. PQCrypta Proxy is written in Rust and serves HTTP/3 over QUIC and HTTP/2 over TCP with hybrid post-quantum key exchange on every listener, Encrypted Client Hello with post-quantum HPKE, WebTransport, MASQUE, JA3/JA4 fingerprinting and a WAF.

What are the PDF tools?

pqpdf.com, our sister site, offers 45 server-side PDF tools without an account. Its PDF threat scanner runs 47 forensic engines and is listed in NIST's Forensic Tool Catalog; its Office document scanner runs 23.

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