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⟨ QUANTUM ERROR PORTAL ⟩

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JA4 Fingerprint Directory

What this edge classifies traffic against, plus what it actually sees — decoded and named, not just listed

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t10d090600_c491f621fb4c_80d8baa1f8cb

Legacy TLS client — inferred from the JA4 handshake shape.

What this fingerprint encodes

JA4_a t10d090600 handshake shape, human-readable
JA4_b c491f621fb4c truncated hash of the cipher list
JA4_c 80d8baa1f8cb truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
Transport
TCP
TLS version
TLS 1.0
Server name
server name sent
Cipher suites offered
9
Extensions offered
6
ALPN
none offered

Same tool, different options

These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version
TLS 1.0

Cipher suites 9

Extensions 6

Named groups 5

Point formats 3

Raw JA3 string
769,49162-49172-57-49161-49171-51-53-47-255,0-11-10-35-22-23,29-23-30-25-24,0-1-2

Seen in live traffic

Connections
2
First seen
2026-08-25 22:42 UTC
Last seen
2026-08-25 23:43 UTC
Transport
TCP

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.