JA4 Fingerprint Directory

t13d1812ht_85036bcba153_d89d4c7b8e02

Safari — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

18

Extensions offered

12

ALPN

ht

Same tool, different options

These 2 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13d4312ht_c7886603b240_d89d4c7b8e02
• t13d3112h2_e8f1e7e78f70_d89d4c7b8e02

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 18

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV

Extensions 12

• server_name
• ec_point_formats
• supported_groups
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• encrypt_then_mac
• extended_master_secret
• post_handshake_auth
• signature_algorithms
• supported_versions
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share
• padding

Named groups 10

• x25519
• secp256r1
• x448
• secp521r1
• secp384r1
• ffdhe2048
• ffdhe3072
• ffdhe4096
• 259 (0x0103)
• 260 (0x0104)

Point formats 3

• uncompressed
• ansiX962_compressed_prime
• ansiX962_compressed_char2

771,4866-4867-4865-49196-49200-49195-49199-52393-52392-49188-49192-49187-49191-159-158-107-103-255,0-11-10-16-22-23-49-13-43-45-51-21,29-23-30-25-24-256-257-258-259-260,0-1-2

Seen in live traffic

Connections

1

First seen

2026-08-23 08:17 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-23 08:17 UTC

Transport

TCP

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/85.0.4183.102 Safari/537.36 1×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.