t13d181300_e8a523a41297_184ca06a0196
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d181300
handshake shape, human-readable
e8a523a41297
truncated hash of the cipher list
184ca06a0196
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 18
- Extensions offered
- 13
- ALPN
- none offered
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 18
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
Extensions 13
-
server_name -
extended_master_secret -
renegotiation_info -
supported_groups -
ec_point_formats -
session_ticket -
status_request -
signature_algorithms -
signed_certificate_timestamp -
key_share -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
supported_versions -
padding
Named groups 3
-
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-52393-52392-49196-49200-49161-49171-49162-49172-156-157-47-53-10,0-23-65281-10-11-35-5-13-18-51-45-43-21,29-23-24,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 151
- First seen
- 2026-08-22 23:51 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-08-23 04:07 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 6.0.1; Nexus 5X Build/MMB29P) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.7922.137 Mobile Safari/537.36 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.83×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 6.0.1; Nexus 5X Build/MMB29P) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.7922.137 Mobile Safari/537.36 (compatible; GoogleOther)68×Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)9×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.