t13d3112ht_1d947a95fc68_68567893068e
Seen in live traffic; not in the curated database.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d3112ht
handshake shape, human-readable
1d947a95fc68
truncated hash of the cipher list
68567893068e
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 31
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- ht
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 31
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
163 (0x00a3) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
162 (0x00a2) -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
106 (0x006a) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
64 (0x0040) -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
56 (0x0038) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
50 (0x0032) -
TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
Extensions 12
-
server_name -
status_request -
supported_groups -
ec_point_formats -
signature_algorithms -
signature_algorithms_cert -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
status_request_v2 -
extended_master_secret -
supported_versions -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
key_share
Named groups 10
-
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1 -
secp521r1 -
x448 -
ffdhe2048 -
ffdhe3072 -
ffdhe4096 -
259 (0x0103) -
260 (0x0104)
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-4867-49196-49195-52393-49200-52392-49199-159-52394-163-158-162-49188-49192-49187-49191-107-106-103-64-49162-49172-49161-49171-57-56-51-50-255,0-5-10-11-13-50-16-17-23-43-45-51,29-23-24-25-30-256-257-258-259-260,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 3
- First seen
- 2026-08-23 00:11 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-08-23 03:12 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; SeznamBot/4.0; +https://o-seznam.cz/napoveda/vyhledavani/en/seznambot-crawler/)1×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.