JA4 Fingerprint Directory

t13d351300_bfa337485184_07030ae8cff1

MJ12bot — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

35

Extensions offered

13

ALPN

none offered

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 35

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA

Extensions 13

• renegotiation_info
• server_name
• ec_point_formats
• supported_groups
• session_ticket
• status_request
• encrypt_then_mac
• extended_master_secret
• signature_algorithms
• supported_versions
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share
• compress_certificate

Named groups 10

• x25519
• secp256r1
• x448
• secp521r1
• secp384r1
• ffdhe2048
• ffdhe3072
• ffdhe4096
• 259 (0x0103)
• 260 (0x0104)

Point formats 3

• uncompressed
• ansiX962_compressed_prime
• ansiX962_compressed_char2

771,4866-4867-4865-4868-49196-49200-52393-52392-49325-49195-49199-49324-49187-49191-49162-49172-49161-49171-157-49309-156-49308-61-60-53-47-159-52394-49311-158-49310-107-103-57-51,65281-0-11-10-35-5-22-23-13-43-45-51-27,29-23-30-25-24-256-257-258-259-260,0-1-2

Seen in live traffic

Connections

5

First seen

2026-08-23 03:31 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-23 06:13 UTC

Transport

TCP

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MJ12bot/v2.0.5; http://mj12bot.com/) 10×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.