t13d3612ht_018971650b2c_2b7f4d1bb443
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d3612ht
handshake shape, human-readable
018971650b2c
truncated hash of the cipher list
2b7f4d1bb443
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 36
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- ht
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 36
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
Extensions 12
-
server_name -
ec_point_formats -
supported_groups -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
encrypt_then_mac -
extended_master_secret -
post_handshake_auth -
signature_algorithms -
supported_versions -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
key_share -
padding
Named groups 5
-
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
x448 -
secp521r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 3
-
uncompressed -
ansiX962_compressed_prime -
ansiX962_compressed_char2
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4867-4865-4868-49196-49200-52393-52392-49325-49195-49199-49324-49187-49191-49162-49172-49161-49171-157-49309-156-49308-61-60-53-47-159-52394-49311-158-49310-107-103-57-51-255,0-11-10-16-22-23-49-13-43-45-51-21,29-23-30-25-24,0-1-2Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 1
- First seen
- 2026-08-23 03:29 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-08-23 03:29 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.