t13d450900_d524c25c267f_295fbc80e014
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d450900
handshake shape, human-readable
d524c25c267f
truncated hash of the cipher list
295fbc80e014
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 45
- Extensions offered
- 9
- ALPN
- none offered
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 45
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
163 (0x00a3) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
162 (0x00a2) -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
106 (0x006a) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
64 (0x0040) -
49198 (0xc02e) -
49202 (0xc032) -
49197 (0xc02d) -
49201 (0xc031) -
49190 (0xc026) -
49194 (0xc02a) -
49189 (0xc025) -
49193 (0xc029) -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
56 (0x0038) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
50 (0x0032) -
49157 (0xc005) -
49167 (0xc00f) -
49156 (0xc004) -
49166 (0xc00e) -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
Extensions 9
-
server_name -
supported_groups -
ec_point_formats -
signature_algorithms -
signature_algorithms_cert -
extended_master_secret -
supported_versions -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
key_share
Named groups 8
-
secp256r1 -
secp384r1 -
secp521r1 -
ffdhe2048 -
ffdhe3072 -
ffdhe4096 -
259 (0x0103) -
260 (0x0104)
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-49196-49195-49200-49199-159-163-158-162-49188-49192-49187-49191-107-106-103-64-49198-49202-49197-49201-49190-49194-49189-49193-49162-49172-49161-49171-57-56-51-50-49157-49167-49156-49166-157-156-61-60-53-47-255,0-10-11-13-50-23-43-45-51,23-24-25-256-257-258-259-260,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 12
- First seen
- 2026-08-22 23:54 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-08-23 03:42 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko; compatible; Amazonbot/0.1; +https://developer.amazon.com/support/amazonbot) Chrome/119.0.6045.214 Safari/537.367×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_1) AppleWebKit/600.2.5 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/8.0.2 Safari/600.2.5 (Gort)2×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.