JA4 Fingerprint Directory

t13d4907h2_0d8feac7bc37_f58b2dd76f93

curl — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

49

Extensions offered

7

ALPN

h2

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 49

• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• 65413 (0xff85)
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
• 129 (0x0081)
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV

Extensions 7

• supported_versions
• key_share
• server_name
• ec_point_formats
• supported_groups
• signature_algorithms
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation

Named groups 4

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4867-4866-4865-52393-52392-52394-49200-49196-49192-49188-49172-49162-159-107-57-65413-196-136-129-157-61-53-192-132-49199-49195-49191-49187-49171-49161-158-103-51-190-69-156-60-47-186-65-49169-49159-5-4-49170-49160-22-10-255,43-51-0-11-10-13-16,29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

1

First seen

2026-08-23 08:13 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-23 08:13 UTC

Transport

TCP

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• curl/8.7.1 1×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.