JA4 Fingerprint Directory

t13d5212h2_b262b3658495_c4728683d87f

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

52

Extensions offered

12

ALPN

h2

Same tool, different options

These 3 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13d2712h2_bd9791dd9fd6_c4728683d87f
• t13d3012h2_1d37bd780c83_c4728683d87f
• t13d1712ht_ab0a1bf427ad_c4728683d87f

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 52

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• 163 (0x00a3)
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
• TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
• 49245 (0xc05d)
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
• 49239 (0xc057)
• 49235 (0xc053)
• 162 (0x00a2)
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
• TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
• 49244 (0xc05c)
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
• 49238 (0xc056)
• 49234 (0xc052)
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• 106 (0x006a)
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• 64 (0x0040)
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• 56 (0x0038)
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• 50 (0x0032)
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
• 49233 (0xc051)
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
• 49232 (0xc050)
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA

Extensions 12

• renegotiation_info
• server_name
• ec_point_formats
• supported_groups
• session_ticket
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• encrypt_then_mac
• extended_master_secret
• signature_algorithms
• supported_versions
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share

Named groups 8

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• x448
• secp384r1
• secp521r1
• ffdhe2048
• ffdhe3072

Point formats 3

• uncompressed
• ansiX962_compressed_prime
• ansiX962_compressed_char2

771,4866-4867-4865-49199-49195-49200-49196-158-49191-103-49192-107-163-159-52393-52392-52394-49325-49311-49245-49249-49239-49235-162-49324-49310-49244-49248-49238-49234-49188-106-49187-64-49162-49172-57-56-49161-49171-51-50-157-49309-49233-156-49308-49232-61-60-53-47,65281-0-11-10-35-16-22-23-13-43-45-51,4588-29-23-30-24-25-256-257,0-1-2

Seen in live traffic

Connections

2

First seen

2026-08-23 18:48 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-23 18:49 UTC

Transport

TCP

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.