t13d531000_ed6c8d7875f9_60527930a971
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d531000
handshake shape, human-readable
ed6c8d7875f9
truncated hash of the cipher list
60527930a971
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 53
- Extensions offered
- 10
- ALPN
- none offered
Same tool, different options
These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 53
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
163 (0x00a3) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM -
TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -
49245 (0xc05d) -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 -
49239 (0xc057) -
49235 (0xc053) -
162 (0x00a2) -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM -
TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -
49244 (0xc05c) -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -
49238 (0xc056) -
49234 (0xc052) -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
106 (0x006a) -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
64 (0x0040) -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
56 (0x0038) -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
50 (0x0032) -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 -
49233 (0xc051) -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 -
49232 (0xc050) -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
Extensions 10
-
server_name -
ec_point_formats -
supported_groups -
session_ticket -
encrypt_then_mac -
extended_master_secret -
signature_algorithms -
supported_versions -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
key_share
Named groups 10
-
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
x448 -
secp521r1 -
secp384r1 -
ffdhe2048 -
ffdhe3072 -
ffdhe4096 -
259 (0x0103) -
260 (0x0104)
Point formats 3
-
uncompressed -
ansiX962_compressed_prime -
ansiX962_compressed_char2
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4867-4865-49199-49195-49200-49196-158-49191-103-49192-107-163-159-52393-52392-52394-49325-49311-49245-49249-49239-49235-162-49324-49310-49244-49248-49238-49234-49188-106-49187-64-49162-49172-57-56-49161-49171-51-50-157-49309-49233-156-49308-49232-61-60-53-47-255,0-11-10-35-22-23-13-43-45-51,29-23-30-25-24-256-257-258-259-260,0-1-2
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 1
- First seen
- 2026-08-24 13:54 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-08-24 13:54 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/134.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.