t13i1515h2_8daaf6152771_d7f4947ee382
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13i1515h2
handshake shape, human-readable
8daaf6152771
truncated hash of the cipher list
d7f4947ee382
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- no server name (IP literal)
- Cipher suites offered
- 15
- Extensions offered
- 15
- ALPN
- h2
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 15
-
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Extensions 15
-
supported_versions -
signed_certificate_timestamp -
ec_point_formats -
key_share -
compress_certificate -
encrypted_client_hello -
status_request -
supported_groups -
session_ticket -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
extended_master_secret -
renegotiation_info -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
signature_algorithms -
17613 (0x44cd)
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4867-4865-4866-52393-52392-49195-49199-49196-49200-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,43-18-11-51-27-65037-5-10-35-16-23-65281-45-13-17613,4588-29-23-24,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 1
- First seen
- 2026-08-24 05:44 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-08-24 05:44 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
RootEvidence/1.01×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.