JA4 Fingerprint Directory

t13i250900_b78ed14e2fd0_e7c285222651

Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

no server name (IP literal)

Cipher suites offered

25

Extensions offered

9

ALPN

none offered

Same tool, different options

These 3 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13i140900_cbb2034c60b8_e7c285222651
• t13i190900_9dc949149365_e7c285222651
• t13i300900_3c43a67630b3_e7c285222651

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 25

• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 9

• ec_point_formats
• renegotiation_info
• extended_master_secret
• signed_certificate_timestamp
• status_request
• supported_groups
• signature_algorithms
• supported_versions
• key_share

Named groups 5

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49161-49171-49162-49172-156-157-47-53-49170-10-49187-49191-60-49159-49169-5-4865-4866-4867,11-65281-23-18-5-10-13-43-51,4588-29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

2

First seen

2026-08-23 18:00 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-23 18:00 UTC

Transport

TCP

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/139.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 2×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.