JA4 q13d0310h3_55b375c5d22e_85bcee6495dd

q13d0310h3_55b375c5d22e_85bcee6495dd

Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

10

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 10

• supported_groups
• supported_versions
• quic_transport_parameters
• key_share
• server_name
• compress_certificate
• signature_algorithms
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• application_settings
• psk_key_exchange_modes

Named groups 3

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

771,4865-4866-4867,10-43-57-51-0-27-13-16-17513-45,29-23-24,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

45

First seen

2026-09-05 00:17 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-09 03:11 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

45

The same client, 45 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 45 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 45 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• d9d2be1d73e24343311ed242dd47e61b
• 2de744e5fa898795cadd0f34af6e7119
• 56e134663997b8633460e79b2527a525
• 6beea3b6144fde982e85ae753b96fc3f
• 6660763d347770520fc6d0db7adf9c32
• ebc5612a13d0926afcd0b7cb24db8c4f
• f0bc0b5645ff4711f8c47a7416aa29eb
• 2291471f6c6dcfa2af8e373209ec9d21
• 385d4ce35ff5f9e7a3573e228aac652a
• 917d4ff918c24b24273cb5e4b750a392
• e2482dc51e9810620c833065dc48fe97
• 0e7adbee6738adec2ff2fa6f871d9543
• … and 33 more

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 196×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/99.0.4844.84 Safari/537.36 190×
• Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 14_4 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/15.4 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.1 145×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_4) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/81.0.4044.138 Safari/537.36 12×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_13_6) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/13.1.2 Safari/605.1.15 9×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/110.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 8×
• Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/114.0.5720.0 Safari/537.36 3×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.