JA4 q13d0311h3_55b375c5d22e_00d49a47e7d1

q13d0311h3_55b375c5d22e_00d49a47e7d1

Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

11

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 11

• signature_algorithms
• quic_transport_parameters
• encrypted_client_hello
• application_settings
• supported_groups
• key_share
• server_name
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• compress_certificate
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• supported_versions

Named groups 4

• X25519Kyber768Draft00
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

771,4865-4866-4867,13-57-65037-17513-10-51-0-45-27-16-43,25497-29-23-24,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

20

First seen

2026-09-03 18:37 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-09 13:18 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

20

The same client, 20 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 20 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 20 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 1dcc8b4c3961a8e86f03597e05026184
• e08fa6acc0acfa3f200632fe5fa3b6e6
• 918062656dddf6a99ed3057c367cd752
• 709a5ae39ca584ec6c31ff71ae4244b6
• 71f87b2c83f60c7c9183e872fdf6460f
• 6ca6f6a7aa5df2210d97469f937a49d0
• 5322e78ad093486676f724f053a67ffb
• 517a0accc488aaeb9724326e5fc9bb94
• 545ec20959a7f012cfd66dfbd7d67ff0
• 9ec7ba075891820056ce730571cfa180
• 43d56a1330872c15cd59a003ea511df6
• 4c23198d1a564f0a46db1fa9503da8a8
• … and 8 more

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; arm_64; Android 15; 2505DRP06G) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/134.0.6998.94 YaBrowser/25.4.5.94.01 Safari/537.36 18×
• Mozilla/5.0 AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/123.0.6312.86 Safari/537.36 BitSightBot/1.0 6×
• Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 3×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/124.0.6367.78 Safari/537.36 1×
• Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 UnveilPhishingML/1.0 (+https://sitereview.unveiltech.com/) 1×
• Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/121.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 1×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.