JA4 q13d0311h3_55b375c5d22e_4a886e84af51

q13d0311h3_55b375c5d22e_4a886e84af51

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

11

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 11

• quic_transport_parameters
• supported_versions
• server_name
• key_share
• ec_point_formats
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• status_request
• signature_algorithms
• supported_groups
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• extended_master_secret

Named groups 4

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• SecP256r1MLKEM768

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4866-4865-4867,57-43-0-51-11-45-5-13-10-16-23,29-23-24-4588,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

2

First seen

2026-08-23 00:55 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-23 01:02 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

2

The same client, 2 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 2 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 2 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 37b8826321fde5e8bf226fbfefd01dbc
• b98c8656e8a5828643e0b0ff30e44dd5

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.