JA4 q13d0311h3_55b375c5d22e_512ac2397e4d

q13d0311h3_55b375c5d22e_512ac2397e4d

PQCrypta HTTP/3 scanner — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

11

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 11

• ec_point_formats
• extended_master_secret
• server_name
• quic_transport_parameters
• supported_groups
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share
• supported_versions
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• signature_algorithms
• status_request

Named groups 4

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4866-4865-4867,11-23-0-57-10-45-51-43-16-13-5,4588-29-23-24,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

4393

First seen

2026-09-14 18:12 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-09 20:26 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

4258

The same client, 4258 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 4258 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 4258 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• c5aed400a2c9fce2bebfbca726d66ba1
• cdc7b403a8647d8d6cfb551adba3ea2b
• 4bd7020104457b10b1a7f5c78f783c5f
• e4ece23550f2929ba12b27992cbab389
• 2a65e1912856ac5831a3e3b03fe1bd9b
• 5ca8c96fd278e27e4565b4780a76338f
• c7cfb48f6b4ac3d0ed2e685a2ce3a647
• eefacaca593165141abd5e436de08182
• 2f22d1dab62a1596e4452d1303c9274f
• 4e1cabb6660a260b148830679870a3ee
• 2e1b53620e837e35e314d65d57f74e3a
• c0b56d8682fffe18d2532970a7022309
• … and 4246 more

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• PQCrypta-HTTP3-Scanner/1.0 3412×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.