q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_2f94236428df
PQCrypta HTTP/3 scanner — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0312h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
2f94236428df
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 12
-
supported_versions -
ec_point_formats -
supported_groups -
key_share -
status_request -
session_ticket -
extended_master_secret -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
quic_transport_parameters -
server_name -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
signature_algorithms
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-4867,43-11-10-51-5-35-23-16-57-0-45-13,4588-29-23-24,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 9822
- First seen
- 2026-08-23 01:10 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-09-27 12:18 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 8806
The same client, 8806 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 8806 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 8806 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
114f028919868e871efa215f1dcceef99822d35ef3997228ce8242d8aba65c9a58dd8b28ee61375bee69271a5594fd491c36c7a33d8490b731ca6dc2232cf417f6b09643e90c766fca12eb2609509605a302666ae8e81068fa94c72aef4bc54a0c6acea5320538610d1ea08af07becc0beab229ef2b3daa80210e8002ad4d42ffecd1bdfd05ad668678d215e6d572ce81a269536bf5e23f49da0330a17742de83d6e912c16272af9bd7c10a5bdc8d5215861ed7022b27fd648fc947e19ee0a50- … and 8794 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
PQCrypta-HTTP3-Scanner/1.04433×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.