JA4 q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_2f94236428df

q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_2f94236428df

PQCrypta HTTP/3 scanner — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

12

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 12

• supported_versions
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• extended_master_secret
• supported_groups
• status_request
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share
• signature_algorithms
• ec_point_formats
• quic_transport_parameters
• server_name
• session_ticket

Named groups 4

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4866-4865-4867,43-16-23-10-5-45-51-13-11-57-0-35,4588-29-23-24,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

1456

First seen

2026-08-22 23:53 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-26 01:40 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

1433

The same client, 1433 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 1433 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 1433 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 7f3ec2e4eb57ef9707323ad1888dc049
• 2b8b01137776073c617e349d646edc7c
• 8d7ad9638eba220ba96a605f7d0c057c
• 4132d429474b293776c3b2806c8a66fb
• 441aedc4baf45ab373ae3466b0877c39
• f282ddfc48deaca254e8f21c2bf63328
• 3927ffca32fe33d63c7456f855afea08
• b01130d552b4d8746a54adb240d11451
• e84d0e0d57663faf95d55a31bde0ff73
• 29d9178906ee5934d0cc0af9680aca0e
• 9eaa37bed55cfbafab5dd8754fee002f
• 0c077b3570b7f14e6064fb3c4185fd22
• … and 1421 more

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• PQCrypta-HTTP3-Scanner/1.0 562×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.