JA4 q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_4bf6f83e6eb6

q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_4bf6f83e6eb6

PQCrypta HTTP/3 scanner — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

12

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 12

• supported_versions
• ec_point_formats
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• key_share
• extended_master_secret
• quic_transport_parameters
• supported_groups
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• server_name
• signature_algorithms
• status_request
• pre_shared_key

Named groups 4

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4866-4865-4867,43-11-16-51-23-57-10-45-0-13-5-41,4588-29-23-24,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

604

First seen

2026-08-22 23:53 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-26 01:40 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

603

The same client, 603 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 603 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 603 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• dd072f2869f151771997eb2b83e86fed
• e35aa67f048e79468f0314c56b808142
• 7dd19ee173672aa6db7f842461841a50
• f2224765ad6d8b40a68fea90e7c9603d
• c2a7fa8b7d79001e0ee7019e4cfb4102
• 5ec72e5575aa6efbe986cff50a2099fc
• 328ce8b8fb9d20e0c48388be72cdff63
• 29ebd447473afafb62035634ae4a5ec2
• 5e64695d8beea2e09f65b4fbd78630a2
• 62a347963305718ff31373198ec4f385
• 304ec2d73d08cf797c3fd341037dce4a
• 5d5f5a29902ff78ff2143d876112cd6c
• … and 591 more

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• PQCrypta-HTTP3-Scanner/1.0 10×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.