q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_4bf6f83e6eb6
PQCrypta HTTP/3 scanner — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0312h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
4bf6f83e6eb6
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 12
-
signature_algorithms -
server_name -
extended_master_secret -
quic_transport_parameters -
supported_groups -
supported_versions -
key_share -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
ec_point_formats -
status_request -
pre_shared_key
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-4867,13-0-23-57-10-43-51-45-16-11-5-41,4588-29-23-24,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 3606
- First seen
- 2026-08-23 08:39 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-09 15:55 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 3402
The same client, 3402 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 3402 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 3402 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
39141acec579f7c848bdcb9906b012b66cf38924d6472f79a69346db1b176446aa341ea0f9bf84b19d84eda0553b9938deb91a96775c0937e81994e750d4e1d0f3e9c2b354a967fc0c35e289ddf85912f0c477fd6f80c0d270535e2f7374bdf06b68cd58dcfd192d0fc9aacbde7af48190efa3d9bcfdae98780e7fb40822c65ac8865f1261a9fd0434dd07a7d3d780797897300d6c7941fb08cf2ac9e294d64fb7ca9decc88d16f2c36ff8ddbcd6e180153c2ccc2121457764368c8a1fca579c- … and 3390 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
PQCrypta-HTTP3-Scanner/1.083×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.