q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_c5d60a76a678
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0312h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
c5d60a76a678
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 12
-
encrypted_client_hello -
server_name -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
supported_groups -
17613 (0x44cd) -
key_share -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
compress_certificate -
signature_algorithms -
quic_transport_parameters -
4832 (0x12e0) -
supported_versions
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867,65037-0-16-10-17613-51-45-27-13-57-4832-43,4588-29-23-24,Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 8
- First seen
- 2026-09-04 00:23 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-09-18 17:58 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 8
The same client, 8 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 8 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 8 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
33a7b4f60646ef4d0b69298d9b2371a7b6bf59ce68a24a1ada4f165a51fbeb3436c062110eec376c4e6df97cd5409d44dac581476ede4357205bc467420b4d4af9afc880877274fcc4d4f28a264dda931548284409ad6d5583a05409ac78f4582a66fd8944ed02242c20ca291445eed78359acd81e8b9e530a1a50cecef7689f
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.0.0 Safari/537.3676×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.3620×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.