q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_c5d60a76a678
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0312h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
c5d60a76a678
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 12
-
encrypted_client_hello -
server_name -
supported_versions -
quic_transport_parameters -
compress_certificate -
4832 (0x12e0) -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
signature_algorithms -
key_share -
supported_groups -
17613 (0x44cd) -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867,65037-0-43-57-27-4832-45-13-51-10-17613-16,4588-29-23-24,Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 10
- First seen
- 2026-08-23 20:37 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-08-26 00:08 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 10
The same client, 10 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 10 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 10 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
e3010c8fd59838c119a0db138f3a05c305c4222df0e2961277e3a4a748f62fce553e4d239e9110f28ae2787d5f2029ce783b8cb3debe832d959b2968efd8691deeeac5240c04b3a996e03389f941de962e296aa883cd8f55ed6f41040a890ffcdb10209cadea40ae52f3ba703337158a7410813a1010734db221f309a5589b50880dd7f6bedd83aa376cfd4c1ed633fa1900ae61e3e9c922cc1805fca44915e0
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.36102×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.0.0 Safari/537.3665×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.0.0 Safari/537.3633×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.