q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_d3a2dad44cbf
Presented a User-Agent we cannot attribute to a known client.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0312h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
d3a2dad44cbf
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Extensions 12
-
quic_transport_parameters -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
ec_point_formats -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
status_request -
compress_certificate -
server_name -
supported_groups -
signature_algorithms -
extended_master_secret -
key_share -
supported_versions
Named groups 3
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
secp384r1 -
secp256r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4867-4865,57-16-11-45-5-27-0-10-13-23-51-43,4588-24-23,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 32
- First seen
- 2026-09-21 00:53 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-09-26 01:18 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 32
The same client, 32 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 32 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 32 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
665852f1f30f19ad6d071a2e70099176b887de096aecc5ecfe205be085e14873277020967b8543e08aaf2fff920edc7afd98edba197108c5c0b2e4f684431cbd45759514b3ce742a1aaad34b063d3012e8e671fe10b262114e8c02e38bc0fce643219b7b0f38f3e2627b231255cc4ed2c9cdc0cff151ea6c1a33f832e3c197ceae82dda5e5ad9de58590f1f2ee1c68bb915f6be78f2a0a51c9a8ddc78ea279d3a0f955454e1420563aab684149f9c1aa9936a9bc663c474f4e5ebd22e7b43099- … and 20 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
h3-get/1.0 (quinn+h3)32×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.