JA4 q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_f9238592c0a5

q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_f9238592c0a5

Firefox — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

12

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

Extensions 12

• encrypted_client_hello
• supported_versions
• server_name
• key_share
• supported_groups
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• 34 (0x0022)
• signature_algorithms
• status_request
• record_size_limit
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• quic_transport_parameters

Named groups 5

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

771,4865-4867-4866,65037-43-0-51-10-16-34-13-5-28-45-57,4588-29-23-24-25,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

2

First seen

2026-08-24 03:30 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-24 16:22 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

2

The same client, 2 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 2 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 2 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• dfee5b5ed001be22c3d2b1a2e401bf89
• ed3f00bb876d04f7460bb4071f463316

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.0 29×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.0 12×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.