q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_f9238592c0a5
Firefox — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0312h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
f9238592c0a5
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Extensions 12
-
encrypted_client_hello -
supported_versions -
server_name -
key_share -
status_request -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
34 (0x0022) -
record_size_limit -
signature_algorithms -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
supported_groups -
quic_transport_parameters
Named groups 5
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1 -
secp521r1
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4867-4866,65037-43-0-51-5-45-34-28-13-16-10-57,4588-29-23-24-25,Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 33
- First seen
- 2026-09-03 14:44 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-05 16:32 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 33
The same client, 33 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 33 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 33 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
23855bdb1ffc9e3c79f8a56699468b1ce5530348ca7c982e6b026c14abc81b083322a1c43ff79f72e0e83591f9b142c43239a6d7a7292f6f32d554e660d3ff983cc3ba852ddf609aa2ce7b724f93a4c43934f9d62eb3afc9a02f33725a9abf6103b3dcb69cb6a762a4b032f866d8b97c5776261b3ce6c4c7d05f901ce62165f79fadfcd58c76b1c3fc44640324a9f163550f1d387a5d6c5cb03d8024f1980b9902f140af56039b2c1e1b50aa225271e3b90e5cd4488326b65268435ca81470c9- … and 21 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.06297×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:136.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/136.028×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.020×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:142.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/142.018×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.