q13d0313h3_55b375c5d22e_0701f65b5a7a
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0313h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
0701f65b5a7a
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 13
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 13
-
server_name -
encrypted_client_hello -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
supported_groups -
signature_algorithms -
quic_transport_parameters -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
4832 (0x12e0) -
supported_versions -
17613 (0x44cd) -
key_share -
compress_certificate -
pre_shared_key
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867,0-65037-45-10-13-57-16-4832-43-17613-51-27-41,4588-29-23-24,Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 20
- First seen
- 2026-09-04 04:32 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-09-06 21:34 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 20
The same client, 20 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 20 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 20 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
5552dc60543646b205ed9930098b903dbf18c550a1f31d0f147ccf082c3d0d97c154966dd6792370e4f8ec1cbd522633d18645d7f76db942d387264436559db940e701f90f97164b75eae346488a9193f43823ef0a39c780fc59ae55d8ec9058060b7156193eba8f2729eabe406247fecb51343aba6e838b043cb7bc2412405ac278dc170ac3f23b87f08a35fb4ffc7002cfccbea4087b0e1d59e5199c82e231379f02c7b880df917cd61dcac8fc61147f4e788488ebceceb2826737748d90cd- … and 8 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.0.0 Safari/537.3636×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.