JA4 q13d0313h3_55b375c5d22e_824790d21c68

q13d0313h3_55b375c5d22e_824790d21c68

Firefox — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

13

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

Extensions 13

• encrypted_client_hello
• server_name
• supported_versions
• quic_transport_parameters
• compress_certificate
• record_size_limit
• signature_algorithms
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• status_request
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share
• 34 (0x0022)
• supported_groups

Named groups 5

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

771,4865-4867-4866,65037-0-43-57-27-28-13-16-5-45-51-34-10,4588-29-23-24-25,

Seen in live traffic

Connections

11

First seen

2026-08-23 11:40 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-25 22:51 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

11

The same client, 11 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 11 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 11 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 6a76e02bf5da2ab9da13259e5712092d
• 6f8604afffff42b2beb4b530d3971da8
• 2f098b106d2f46eb753c90a81092b7e4
• 0b5d3ab3b7de640b88ca0e837c3d1dd1
• c7bbb8bac6a63c553b0c72e949bd2797
• e3a0def1f5bd9ab8aa3b83d3b455530c
• db2cd8abe37092b46e4f5f00ec386a9c
• 2f0c32d62fa1b98a8f0c65534d27ca22
• 54f12705ce7705f7886599ebe8426f54
• 3a55b092c7f3aafc78d87b81bcff2870
• d7bec73653b0984f628a987e24d5b156

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:154.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/154.0 500×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:154.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/154.0 134×
• Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:154.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/154.0 26×
• Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:153.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/153.0 19×
• Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:154.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/154.0 12×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:152.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/152.0 11×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.