q13d0314h3_55b375c5d22e_5e8caae252b6
Firefox — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0314h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
5e8caae252b6
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 14
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Extensions 14
-
server_name -
extended_master_secret -
renegotiation_info -
supported_groups -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
status_request -
34 (0x0022) -
key_share -
supported_versions -
signature_algorithms -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
record_size_limit -
quic_transport_parameters -
encrypted_client_hello
Named groups 4
-
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1 -
secp521r1
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4867-4866,0-23-65281-10-16-5-34-51-43-13-45-28-57-65037,29-23-24-25,Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 146
- First seen
- 2026-09-03 14:44 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-04 19:25 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 144
The same client, 144 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 144 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 144 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
7a8e625dea44f20fe8d8d657583506d1b54cfe4f6eb3b8e65e265d6498a8cdb1c4cc0f6d67c890a8f04e0a6139a22cc5b7deb6d57758ae273a65be9c11e17e809309e9a7b0ab48aa31ced69b79bd802013b6ec9b6377120493151a952317c71ee5d42316feb4c01fbc101c7b2a2af09bf114c551ece7f78130747e76e66d11f442547d5c6891077ae6e3d23103fe7f427bf2baa074e588fcf66c5d196105d32baf71bc11bf1cd9f1d7ad7eb02940350320cf872ec8e4208178c6aca7448538fe- … and 132 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.03162×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.010×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.04×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.