q13d0314h3_55b375c5d22e_5e8caae252b6
Firefox — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0314h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
5e8caae252b6
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 14
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Extensions 14
-
psk_key_exchange_modes -
record_size_limit -
34 (0x0022) -
server_name -
supported_versions -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
extended_master_secret -
status_request -
supported_groups -
signature_algorithms -
renegotiation_info -
key_share -
quic_transport_parameters -
encrypted_client_hello
Named groups 5
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1 -
secp521r1
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4867-4866,45-28-34-0-43-16-23-5-10-13-65281-51-57-65037,4588-29-23-24-25,Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 14
- First seen
- 2026-08-24 16:22 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-08-26 01:15 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 14
The same client, 14 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 14 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 14 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
93ba473f78f4d7ba786e43772b9ff9c2fb9c592fb3404f51b6d22848a75aa051cb4ca993534b8ad63a6f46436da707a7e073bf3733d278fed52440109661b86dfe7b54ca892f08615caa469a891e4d52be7a45101ba74b2a2a3ad11ff0062c493440e63e6659b25845df29a03d8f567351f54459059f4a1edb4b1b33152968befa3829c5bf12d6d36bc6414a6f5a8ac5cb32ebaa0bbdc906c930b14394d7f6e76305bccc9a28e1dec64d042da5497863707861970f2fbea22fca5b88cf4c8b17- … and 2 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.06177×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.