q13d0315h3_55b375c5d22e_6af405fcf435
Firefox — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13d0315h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
6af405fcf435
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 15
- ALPN
- h3
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Extensions 15
-
extended_master_secret -
key_share -
supported_versions -
34 (0x0022) -
renegotiation_info -
signature_algorithms -
compress_certificate -
server_name -
record_size_limit -
status_request -
supported_groups -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
quic_transport_parameters -
encrypted_client_hello
Named groups 5
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1 -
secp521r1
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4867-4866,23-51-43-34-65281-13-27-0-28-5-10-45-16-57-65037,4588-29-23-24-25,Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 93
- First seen
- 2026-09-10 14:48 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-09-14 15:19 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 93
The same client, 93 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 93 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 93 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
d17d855227cc6bf731bac64bb6cc32b74b98bb4d270c4fe36848447ebf85370254805db6a5ca72e33eaaabf091030351e6fd158e9bf622e4ccc60b6c1d6566adc2522b0d468520f02ef89904392138befe2828af143d628787a3e37e680d6b5eb07360960bb3648dc08d277139291a132cfcc47571a482e88b42cfc4f6b423a24c7afc7557d244abb01bdafbf2034196958cbdb84bc25da680335d8da6caf3fcf4d51d0922eb47a718b1be989084f3d5e91c8015c6def89b7b0fb9c6da7dd9d0- … and 81 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:155.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/155.0133×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.