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JA4 t12d020400_c9fe23a5d87c_b648b7f3bc8e

Unclassified — observed in live traffic

Unclassified

t12d020400_c9fe23a5d87c_b648b7f3bc8e

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

JA4_a t12d020400 handshake shape, human-readable
JA4_b c9fe23a5d87c truncated hash of the cipher list
JA4_c b648b7f3bc8e truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
Transport
TCP
TLS version
TLS 1.2
Server name
server name sent
Cipher suites offered
2
Extensions offered
4
ALPN
none offered

Same tool, different options

These 80 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version
TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 2

Extensions 4

Raw JA3 string
771,67-255,0-35-13-15,,

Seen in live traffic

Connections
1
First seen
2026-08-27 10:12 UTC
Last seen
2026-08-27 10:12 UTC
Transport
TCP

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.