JA4 t12d390900_1def6453891d_25c8f61c4618

t12d390900_1def6453891d_25c8f61c4618

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.2

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

39

Extensions offered

9

ALPN

none offered

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 39

• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
• TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• 9 (0x0009)
• 21 (0x0015)
• TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

Extensions 9

• renegotiation_info
• ec_point_formats
• extended_master_secret
• server_name
• status_request
• signature_algorithms
• record_size_limit
• supported_groups
• padding

Named groups 4

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4867-52393-4865-4866-52394-52392-49195-49161-49172-158-103-49187-57-49191-49162-53-49196-47-49188-107-156-49192-49171-61-157-60-49200-49195-159-51-49199-49170-4-49169-5-22-9-21-10,65281-11-23-0-5-13-28-10-21,29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

2

First seen

2026-10-08 10:21 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-08 10:21 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

2

The same client, 2 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 2 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 2 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 6a7934580c52190d234a710d9633396c
• e638da8ad2ee24dbc48fd57568acc05c

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.