JA4 t12d520600_7554301188de_a6ad5fe9ef24

t12d520600_7554301188de_a6ad5fe9ef24

Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.2

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

52

Extensions offered

6

ALPN

none offered

Same tool, different options

These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t12d400600_44c89e5422f1_a6ad5fe9ef24

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 52

• 20 (0x0014)
• 64 (0x0040)
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
• 23 (0x0017)
• 163 (0x00a3)
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• 3 (0x0003)
• 19 (0x0013)
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• 17 (0x0011)
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• 18 (0x0012)
• 56 (0x0038)
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• 102 (0x0066)
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
• 6 (0x0006)
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
• 25 (0x0019)
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• 162 (0x00a2)
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• 50 (0x0032)
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
• 21 (0x0015)
• TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• 8 (0x0008)
• TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• 106 (0x006a)

Extensions 6

• server_name
• status_request
• supported_groups
• ec_point_formats
• signature_algorithms
• renegotiation_info

Named groups 3

• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,20-64-49195-159-103-49169-23-163-49192-3-19-52392-60-49199-156-49191-49188-47-61-52394-17-157-49162-53-18-56-49200-102-49160-49161-49187-52393-51-49172-4-6-49159-25-57-158-162-49196-50-49170-49171-5-21-22-8-10-107-106,0-5-10-11-13-65281,23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

2

First seen

2026-08-23 18:01 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-25 23:08 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

2

The same client, 2 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 2 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 2 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 9bae73ecf9c82b1e8a3e876c5943cbf5
• d5443a7b05a29f81ec7c17657fff284c

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.