t12d560700_8aab05645947_b84f7053a7d6
Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.
What this fingerprint encodes
t12d560700
handshake shape, human-readable
8aab05645947
truncated hash of the cipher list
b84f7053a7d6
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.2
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 56
- Extensions offered
- 7
- ALPN
- none offered
Same tool, different options
These 4 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
- t12d610700_8a10cb45a794_b84f7053a7d6
- t12d650700_0dd215169a35_b84f7053a7d6
- t12d860700_e18388e7f3a3_b84f7053a7d6
- t12d990700_a40d17a72bcb_b84f7053a7d6
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 56
-
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
49202 (0xc032) -
49198 (0xc02e) -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
49201 (0xc031) -
49197 (0xc02d) -
163 (0x00a3) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
162 (0x00a2) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
49194 (0xc02a) -
49190 (0xc026) -
49167 (0xc00f) -
49157 (0xc005) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
106 (0x006a) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
56 (0x0038) -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
49193 (0xc029) -
49189 (0xc025) -
49166 (0xc00e) -
49156 (0xc004) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
64 (0x0040) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
50 (0x0032) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA -
135 (0x0087) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA -
68 (0x0044) -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -
49165 (0xc00d) -
49155 (0xc003) -
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -
19 (0x0013) -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -
TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
Extensions 7
-
server_name -
ec_point_formats -
supported_groups -
session_ticket -
signature_algorithms -
heartbeat -
padding
Named groups 13
-
secp256r1 -
secp521r1 -
28 (0x001c) -
27 (0x001b) -
secp384r1 -
26 (0x001a) -
22 (0x0016) -
14 (0x000e) -
13 (0x000d) -
11 (0x000b) -
12 (0x000c) -
9 (0x0009) -
10 (0x000a)
Point formats 3
-
uncompressed -
ansiX962_compressed_prime -
ansiX962_compressed_char2
Raw JA3 string
771,49200-49196-49202-49198-49199-49195-49201-49197-163-159-162-158-49192-49188-49172-49162-49194-49190-49167-49157-107-106-57-56-49191-49187-49171-49161-49193-49189-49166-49156-103-64-51-50-136-135-69-68-49170-49160-49165-49155-22-19-157-156-61-53-60-47-132-65-10-255,0-11-10-35-13-15-21,23-25-28-27-24-26-22-14-13-11-12-9-10,0-1-2Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 2
- First seen
- 2026-09-02 18:46 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-09-02 18:46 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.