t12d620500_f293919562b9_654fe63324b3
Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.
What this fingerprint encodes
t12d620500
handshake shape, human-readable
f293919562b9
truncated hash of the cipher list
654fe63324b3
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.2
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 62
- Extensions offered
- 5
- ALPN
- none offered
Same tool, different options
These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 62
-
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
65413 (0xff85) -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA -
129 (0x0081) -
49177 (0xc019) -
167 (0x00a7) -
109 (0x006d) -
58 (0x003a) -
197 (0x00c5) -
137 (0x0089) -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA -
49176 (0xc018) -
166 (0x00a6) -
108 (0x006c) -
52 (0x0034) -
191 (0x00bf) -
70 (0x0046) -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -
49174 (0xc016) -
24 (0x0018) -
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -
49175 (0xc017) -
27 (0x001b) -
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -
TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
Extensions 5
-
server_name -
ec_point_formats -
supported_groups -
session_ticket -
signature_algorithms
Named groups 3
-
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,52393-52392-52394-49200-49196-49192-49188-49172-49162-159-107-57-65413-196-136-129-49177-167-109-58-197-137-157-61-53-192-132-49199-49195-49191-49187-49171-49161-158-103-51-190-69-49176-166-108-52-191-70-156-60-47-186-65-49169-49159-49174-24-5-4-49170-49160-22-49175-27-10-255,0-11-10-35-13,29-23-24,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 8
- First seen
- 2026-10-01 12:48 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-01 12:48 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.