t13d070500_c2f3549b8eb7_1a196bf7ea71
Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d070500
handshake shape, human-readable
c2f3549b8eb7
truncated hash of the cipher list
1a196bf7ea71
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 7
- Extensions offered
- 5
- ALPN
- none offered
Same tool, different options
These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 7
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 -
198 (0x00c6) -
199 (0x00c7)
Extensions 5
-
supported_groups -
server_name -
signature_algorithms -
supported_versions -
key_share
Named groups 48
-
15 (0x000f) -
16 (0x0010) -
17 (0x0011) -
18 (0x0012) -
19 (0x0013) -
20 (0x0014) -
21 (0x0015) -
22 (0x0016) -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1 -
secp521r1 -
1 (0x0001) -
2 (0x0002) -
3 (0x0003) -
4 (0x0004) -
5 (0x0005) -
6 (0x0006) -
7 (0x0007) -
8 (0x0008) -
9 (0x0009) -
10 (0x000a) -
11 (0x000b) -
12 (0x000c) -
13 (0x000d) -
14 (0x000e) -
x25519 -
x448 -
41 (0x0029) -
26 (0x001a) -
27 (0x001b) -
28 (0x001c) -
31 (0x001f) -
32 (0x0020) -
33 (0x0021) -
ffdhe2048 -
ffdhe3072 -
ffdhe4096 -
259 (0x0103) -
260 (0x0104) -
SecP384r1MLKEM1024 -
513 (0x0201) -
514 (0x0202) -
4585 (0x11e9) -
4586 (0x11ea) -
X25519MLKEM768 -
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
4589 (0x11ed) -
4590 (0x11ee)
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-4868-4869-198-199,10-0-13-43-51,15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23-24-25-1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-29-30-41-26-27-28-31-32-33-256-257-258-259-260-512-513-514-4585-4586-4587-4588-4589-4590,
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 10
- First seen
- 2026-09-17 13:53 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-09-17 14:19 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 3
The same client, 3 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 3 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 3 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
befaec56d37047ec064813d7aa625d19d182279e6f41087335aa75c9d114d6b750e04f3c4722ebf608e403c99944152a
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.