t13d090900_778603501f98_d08fc002a886
Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d090900
handshake shape, human-readable
778603501f98
truncated hash of the cipher list
d08fc002a886
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 9
- Extensions offered
- 9
- ALPN
- none offered
Same tool, different options
These 3 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
- t13d020900_fffbd61365f3_d08fc002a886
- t13d070900_72bbeb4dfc47_d08fc002a886
- t13d080900_42230c8c7b22_d08fc002a886
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 9
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 -
49332 (0xc0b4) -
49333 (0xc0b5) -
198 (0x00c6) -
199 (0x00c7)
Extensions 9
-
server_name -
supported_groups -
ec_point_formats -
signature_algorithms -
signed_certificate_timestamp -
supported_versions -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
key_share -
padding
Named groups 30
-
514 (0x0202) -
4589 (0x11ed) -
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
X25519MLKEM768 -
513 (0x0201) -
SecP384r1MLKEM1024 -
4585 (0x11e9) -
4586 (0x11ea) -
4590 (0x11ee) -
X25519Kyber768Draft00 -
25498 (0x639a) -
secp384r1 -
secp256r1 -
secp521r1 -
x25519 -
x448 -
26 (0x001a) -
27 (0x001b) -
28 (0x001c) -
31 (0x001f) -
32 (0x0020) -
33 (0x0021) -
22 (0x0016) -
21 (0x0015) -
41 (0x0029) -
ffdhe2048 -
ffdhe3072 -
ffdhe4096 -
259 (0x0103) -
260 (0x0104)
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-4868-4869-49332-49333-198-199,0-10-11-13-18-43-45-51-21,514-4589-4588-4587-513-512-4585-4586-4590-25497-25498-24-23-25-29-30-26-27-28-31-32-33-22-21-41-256-257-258-259-260,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 18
- First seen
- 2026-10-11 18:20 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-11 18:24 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 5
The same client, 5 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 5 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 5 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
86bc1d7af986ffe3a189337ba88e89ecdf25873a9eaf3d35ea2ca0be5f500f9464e1c6870fad85c371f20c3555f275fec06ccd5f67273be5135a6d523359fc894edef45fca15a25c930b4c5475c5812e
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.