JA4 t13d091100_f91f431d341e_6ecbdee5c734

t13d091100_f91f431d341e_6ecbdee5c734

Shares its JA4_c (6ecbdee5c734) with 2 fingerprints classified as browser, and nothing else in that family disagrees — the same tool under different cipher options. Inferred from the family, not observed directly.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

9

Extensions offered

11

ALPN

none offered

Same tool, different options

These 4 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13d171100_ab0a1bf427ad_6ecbdee5c734
• t13d301100_1d37bd780c83_6ecbdee5c734
• t13d521100_b262b3658495_6ecbdee5c734
• t13d681100_13e0e9e1c501_6ecbdee5c734

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 9

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 11

• renegotiation_info
• server_name
• ec_point_formats
• supported_groups
• session_ticket
• encrypt_then_mac
• extended_master_secret
• signature_algorithms
• supported_versions
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share

Named groups 4

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

Point formats 3

• uncompressed
• ansiX962_compressed_prime
• ansiX962_compressed_char2

771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392,65281-0-11-10-35-22-23-13-43-45-51,4588-29-23-24,0-1-2

Seen in live traffic

Connections

4

First seen

2026-10-06 20:46 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-06 20:46 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

3

The same client, 3 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 3 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 3 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 92d53e5b9402ec3a4fdcdfc6b33a90d0
• 19e43a91e2ef3bbafcd4d7c928cd75cf
• 9e174d5d770d27c79712285d15c53933

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.