t13d101000_61a7ad8aa9b6_d5d75a0face9
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d101000
handshake shape, human-readable
61a7ad8aa9b6
truncated hash of the cipher list
d5d75a0face9
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 10
- Extensions offered
- 10
- ALPN
- none offered
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 10
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
Extensions 10
-
psk_key_exchange_modes -
status_request -
supported_groups -
supported_versions -
ec_point_formats -
signature_algorithms -
key_share -
server_name -
extended_master_secret -
session_ticket
Named groups 3
-
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-4867-49196-49195-52393-49200-49199-52392-255,45-5-10-43-11-13-51-0-23-35,29-23-24,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 289
- First seen
- 2026-08-30 04:19 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-10 07:48 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 280
The same client, 280 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 280 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 280 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
b72ad960cb9d86059438605a5470cc61444af20dba6f899c2d69f252474941157b42b1f632bdc93804aec49b2dc2760d47f7db1b3b54adabfcdb82ff5e0b2fd5ffc99e1d76a7d7126c40788438d3f6f1282e38ded4da6519eeb610385b2cab6866c957006bf9c902f77b648855655b4bcefaed4aaa440eaf4a2dddda8d3c45f69510b32fadb52e9d87b836a1e467baa7165dcce3990416951951eac8ec0c3007d61d90cc1b5258c5ea30e061141cf7bb4c8cc16fb46e099d74b39ecd45f6fcf1- … and 268 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/147.0.0.0 Safari/537.36280×Mozilla/5.0 AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko; compatible; PerplexityBot/1.0; +https://perplexity.ai/perplexitybot)8×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.