t13d101200_01be160bb49b_d42405ff081a
Shares its JA4_c (d42405ff081a) with 1 fingerprint classified as browser, and nothing else in that family disagrees — the same tool under different cipher options. Inferred from the family, not observed directly.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d101200
handshake shape, human-readable
01be160bb49b
truncated hash of the cipher list
d42405ff081a
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 10
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- none offered
Same tool, different options
These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 10
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
Extensions 12
-
server_name -
supported_versions -
signature_algorithms -
session_ticket -
supported_groups -
ec_point_formats -
key_share -
post_handshake_auth -
extended_master_secret -
renegotiation_info -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
pre_shared_key
Named groups 2
-
secp384r1 -
secp256r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-49200-49199-49192-49191-49196-49195-49188-49187,0-43-13-35-10-11-51-49-23-65281-45-41,24-23,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 2
- First seen
- 2026-09-16 16:14 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-09-16 16:14 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) SkypeUriPreview Preview/0.5 skype-url-preview@microsoft.com2×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.