t13d1012h1_61a7ad8aa9b6_5461484b2bee
Completed a TLS handshake but never an HTTP request, so no User-Agent was ever presented.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d1012h1
handshake shape, human-readable
61a7ad8aa9b6
truncated hash of the cipher list
5461484b2bee
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 10
- Extensions offered
- 12
- ALPN
- h1
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 10
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
Extensions 12
-
signature_algorithms -
key_share -
extended_master_secret -
status_request -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
session_ticket -
supported_versions -
supported_groups -
server_name -
compress_certificate -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
ec_point_formats
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-4867-49196-49195-52393-49200-49199-52392-255,13-51-23-5-16-35-43-10-0-27-45-11,4588-29-23-24,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 12
- First seen
- 2026-09-27 09:20 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-09-27 09:46 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 12
The same client, 12 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 12 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 12 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
b5266e7d24b66bbe8d87f6cc0c5b95a76f239af49820b8e12486f85b226b0174e494d1aedbe4268023ed9fe41b1100f402e4ff2fcd990676c321c50a76fe495314ba6a93b72834ba12d5007242711b23cd1c2b4a97fe41269b55d583fd057c00504f7b7a1eff1e694a7f63c6b3c73ade7d1a3b18a48cbf401ad7b467d6dcb35460fcab6d3d4556e64a34d613f01ffe0deaa0d8e830a9b03f7c4e21a9bffc910d5a078e34790f2ec6885d66d0726b082cdb554ccbe2ee5ca23038ad74acc9679d
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.