JA4 t13d1313ht_f57a46bbacb6_fb18a4f6686c

t13d1313ht_f57a46bbacb6_fb18a4f6686c

Shares its JA4_c (fb18a4f6686c) with 1 fingerprint classified as browser, and nothing else in that family disagrees — the same tool under different cipher options. Inferred from the family, not observed directly.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

13

Extensions offered

13

ALPN

ht

Same tool, different options

These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13d2013h2_a09f3c656075_fb18a4f6686c

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 13

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA

Extensions 13

• server_name
• extended_master_secret
• renegotiation_info
• supported_groups
• ec_point_formats
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• status_request
• signature_algorithms
• signed_certificate_timestamp
• key_share
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• supported_versions
• compress_certificate

Named groups 5

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4866-4865-4867-49196-49200-49195-52393-49199-52392-49162-49161-49172-49171,0-23-65281-10-11-16-5-13-18-51-45-43-27,4588-29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

4

First seen

2026-08-28 18:37 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-28 18:37 UTC

Transport

TCP

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Snagit/2026.92 CFNetwork/3860.600.21 Darwin/25.5.0 4×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.