JA4 t13d140800_0c27f4e60a3e_e2dcb997b12f

t13d140800_0c27f4e60a3e_e2dcb997b12f

Firefox — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

14

Extensions offered

8

ALPN

none offered

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 14

• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV

Extensions 8

• supported_versions
• server_name
• session_ticket
• signature_algorithms
• status_request
• supported_groups
• key_share
• ec_point_formats

Named groups 4

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,49196-49195-49188-52393-49187-49200-49199-49192-52392-49191-4866-4867-4865-255,43-0-35-13-5-10-51-11,29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

10

First seen

2026-10-05 06:28 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-05 06:28 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

10

The same client, 10 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 10 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 10 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 51a2e7e37fc82860e36cef5df3416d62
• 17db51ff79a6b1854ee7aacd91f2be32
• 0b420cbf3dd56f47ebfbee8e45319116
• af30118040df8f212c76ed169808bf2e
• 68a0a2f0dc9e6a15c93dccd99aed364d
• a916608e4e9df5a5e6f8baff48168743
• f4c2a77461a406825fda81ff3a9cb8d1
• fda416bc1d4b106100a8178c64469cad
• 6d784890b54e330a92830952f914e42a
• 4efafd545cb5569ca609f97dbe9d010f

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:140.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/140.0 30×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.