t13d151500_8daaf6152771_8802cfb92a1f
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d151500
handshake shape, human-readable
8daaf6152771
truncated hash of the cipher list
8802cfb92a1f
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 15
- Extensions offered
- 15
- ALPN
- none offered
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 15
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Extensions 15
-
signed_certificate_timestamp -
signature_algorithms -
ec_point_formats -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
encrypted_client_hello -
supported_versions -
status_request -
renegotiation_info -
session_ticket -
17613 (0x44cd) -
supported_groups -
extended_master_secret -
compress_certificate -
server_name -
key_share
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,18-13-11-45-65037-43-5-65281-35-17613-10-23-27-0-51,4588-29-23-24,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 11
- First seen
- 2026-09-10 00:00 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-06 00:04 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 11
The same client, 11 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 11 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 11 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
940f99f268c1067d744dee10ca37d1dc732604fb5819a7d7be033aeb642475c58ee4e0edc4e2a366aa4947bc757a48ae59ae169ab6051cef733310ebbd2397965d4360a4357abcf36889e028f6cec8c91dd1b3441a580708e83319c811b0e8ab9a1117ee18cf0ab8b5c8d7375b8a2d659e522eb40aa5b44a7be47326919ad15c85e3bde0a2b011e00a1f2488331ed6e49e826a43ce1a8e210d593cf2b505b9def373af9dbd6e756d405e483d08327268
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/148.0.0.0 Safari/537.3610×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 5.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Mobile Safari/537.36 (compatible; Bytespider; spider-feedback@bytedance.com)2×Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 18_4 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) CriOS/151.0.0.0 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.11×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/133.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/136.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/145.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 18_3 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) CriOS/148.0.0.0 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.11×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.