JA4 t13d1515h2_8daaf6152771_b088141deb13

t13d1515h2_8daaf6152771_b088141deb13

Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

15

Extensions offered

15

ALPN

h2

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 15

• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA

Extensions 15

• supported_versions
• signature_algorithms
• signed_certificate_timestamp
• renegotiation_info
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• status_request
• compress_certificate
• extended_master_secret
• session_ticket
• ec_point_formats
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• application_settings
• supported_groups
• server_name
• key_share

Named groups 4

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,43-13-18-65281-16-5-27-23-35-11-45-17513-10-0-51,4588-29-23-24,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

333

First seen

2026-09-05 17:15 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-11 18:37 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

10

The same client, 10 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 10 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 10 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 6ce79781ca515e612862952961750f17
• eca8ab166c18644955bc8280bf27b9d1
• e2d9108f8b28704da663ec5848e8c230
• 5302f47017a7311d5131bc7f4e486f39
• 182df799c043ca31650395010053e6d9
• b24b2457a5813a215a237dca11f8e56a
• 7185399b4e28c0ff570e97a5a9acedd5
• 67bb70782ee0ca22f932c319789c96b3
• d4a62770650492ebd2fff4f6bfdf2895
• a0bd1a96175686f14278a9366fbfa545

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/76.0.3843.181 Safari/537.36 2×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.2436.95 Safari/537.36 2×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/68.0.2686.154 Safari/537.36 2×
• Go-http-client/2.0 1×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.