t13d1516h2_8daaf6152771_02e122b4eadb
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d1516h2
handshake shape, human-readable
8daaf6152771
truncated hash of the cipher list
02e122b4eadb
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 15
- Extensions offered
- 16
- ALPN
- h2
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 15
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Extensions 16
-
supported_groups -
status_request -
extended_master_secret -
renegotiation_info -
encrypted_client_hello -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
ec_point_formats -
key_share -
signed_certificate_timestamp -
compress_certificate -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
17613 (0x44cd) -
signature_algorithms -
session_ticket -
supported_versions -
server_name
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,10-5-23-65281-65037-45-11-51-18-27-16-17613-13-35-43-0,4588-29-23-24,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 325
- First seen
- 2026-08-22 23:52 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-08-26 00:59 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 325
The same client, 325 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 325 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 325 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
546b63b8c7b984e36de31d6f4d68bb5f70280ac06e86780d7b14a1dda481e293c86c114393ad62d58da24a673cce8e49f98c2ede258d194a2b4d9dc9853e078457286e6f3c1bb56e9971719b9b725687536e2be77cb36baaeaeccb054292732b8e00345e8df08644583e8ac7db15cad3ebade7a51a81f56d6598d8c0ed6a8e6c1300fa9803ce3b59c320da6cab3027757ff51b77956daaffc78f399b3913e8976e68dc1baca05d278ed6e2ff4e9a992d8d0d3f70b6dd7a8992669749ee7627e3- … and 313 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.0.0 Safari/537.36387×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/151.0.0.0310×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.0.0 Safari/537.36211×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.36133×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.0.0 Safari/537.36103×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/150.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/150.0.0.048×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/150.0.0.0 Safari/537.3641×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/122.0.0.0 Safari/537.3639×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.3637×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/150.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.3624×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/151.0.0.0 Safari/537.3614×RootEvidence/1.013×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/151.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/151.0.0.013×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 5.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Mobile Safari/537.36 (compatible; Bytespider; https://zhanzhang.toutiao.com/)3×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/151.0.7922.34 Safari/537.362×Mozilla/5.0 AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko); compatible; ShapBot/0.1.02×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.