t13d1516h2_8daaf6152771_0602f039c590
Edge — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d1516h2
handshake shape, human-readable
8daaf6152771
truncated hash of the cipher list
0602f039c590
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 15
- Extensions offered
- 16
- ALPN
- h2
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 15
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Extensions 16
-
signature_algorithms -
17613 (0x44cd) -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
key_share -
compress_certificate -
supported_versions -
signed_certificate_timestamp -
session_ticket -
renegotiation_info -
encrypted_client_hello -
status_request -
extended_master_secret -
ec_point_formats -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
supported_groups -
server_name
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,13-17613-45-51-27-43-18-35-65281-65037-5-23-11-16-10-0,4588-29-23-24,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 164
- First seen
- 2026-09-03 13:26 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-09 23:49 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 164
The same client, 164 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 164 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 164 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
bffffe93457f63d6e5db67fdce30ce954e50d4e1c6462f9bb89a90c87586a6b3b5362a4543d847f9f4b7b069b9c1a94682ae3b6b1d681445e63aae517c37a6919b5009c274a2a15fa6f7ba864eac3f0980d0a0c78e0522277e65b89f32c6c847e3e8bd68daa5e3148fe79f7bd24b58fc8201e3e28e07003dbb44fa03a5cf5ea1f37d393da5e832fed9e117e1690eb48d7523455edb6e9b5618fa2357a476a465854ddbd261f0e15c5a1d53e48809a6cd2188e1c344a11fbcd8362669393a76c8- … and 152 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/154.0.0.0654×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/153.0.8010.12 Safari/537.36482×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/153.0.0.0423×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/152.0.0.085×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.3658×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3637×Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; AhrefsBot/7.0; +http://ahrefs.com/robot/)32×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.36 EdgA/153.0.0.031×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.3623×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.365×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.364×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.363×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.362×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 15; 23049RAD8C Build/AQ3A.241006.001) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.8010.36 Mobile Safari/537.362×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.362×Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 26_6_0 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) CriOS/152.0.7977.64 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.11×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 26_1_0 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) CriOS/152.0.7977.64 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.11×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.