t13d1516h2_8daaf6152771_2c66ae2d0ce4
Headless Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d1516h2
handshake shape, human-readable
8daaf6152771
truncated hash of the cipher list
2c66ae2d0ce4
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 15
- Extensions offered
- 16
- ALPN
- h2
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 15
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Extensions 16
-
status_request -
signature_algorithms -
extended_master_secret -
signed_certificate_timestamp -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
supported_groups -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
server_name -
session_ticket -
ec_point_formats -
encrypted_client_hello -
compress_certificate -
17613 (0x44cd) -
renegotiation_info -
key_share -
supported_versions
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,5-13-23-18-16-10-45-0-35-11-65037-27-17613-65281-51-43,4588-29-23-24,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 153
- First seen
- 2026-09-03 17:11 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-09 23:49 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 153
The same client, 153 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 153 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 153 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
8c09ae10620432569355fa9c8663ecd0bfca6b3be2b5cd608585b01839a318eecd7d45a7a5d16718b295b6b948ee9c3147d4820f5521973549dc9a2f0054689c7502a11aa15f4bc75b3b8ab9aaadfb67520fdebf8bb3945f91e9a9a597b8ca2d44e5073ba8132863288dc1dfd438ff2faae105804a3a5dddd55669ce17f16f4ead4a04a766d384bcb2040177a994602792dfb52ec71dc3963a2546e6cdc453e62538d65aae41bceacc4e4717c24e7f3e89f76e0df085948ef0cbc011a7bcbd29- … and 141 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/153.0.8010.12 Safari/537.36734×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/153.0.0.0519×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/154.0.0.0168×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/152.0.0.0138×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/155.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/155.0.0.045×Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; AhrefsBot/7.0; +http://ahrefs.com/robot/)22×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.3613×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/152.0.0.09×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.366×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.365×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.365×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.365×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.363×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 15; 23049RAD8C Build/AQ3A.241006.001) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.8010.36 Mobile Safari/537.362×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; CrOS x86_64 14541.0.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.36 EdgA/153.0.0.01×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.361×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.