t13d1517h2_8daaf6152771_1fda708985f1
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d1517h2
handshake shape, human-readable
8daaf6152771
truncated hash of the cipher list
1fda708985f1
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 15
- Extensions offered
- 17
- ALPN
- h2
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 15
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Extensions 17
-
signed_certificate_timestamp -
signature_algorithms -
key_share -
compress_certificate -
status_request -
renegotiation_info -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
session_ticket -
ec_point_formats -
supported_versions -
extended_master_secret -
supported_groups -
17613 (0x44cd) -
51764 (0xca34) -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
encrypted_client_hello -
server_name
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,18-13-51-27-5-65281-45-35-11-43-23-10-17613-51764-16-65037-0,4588-29-23-24,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 205
- First seen
- 2026-09-03 14:57 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-11 18:10 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 205
The same client, 205 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 205 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 205 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
6a5208198541cd629ba9fde6b844c715f23b30caacfc2cf1de7a621a40e3aff234617a1823f66eb639ad42c3f3f4c3e06f6fab6a65e8eabe2b4496afc38bbdd8ad097185967f6bc175ec5ae52ed9aa5d66f0d732aca5c8b2d00cee4d0fad8def449b7a8b6eefc9f5af2ed3ab82241a84f2803555b802d7f0abce93890a64a45028b0300d1e04aecebcf0d8bfae3a618763384dc3590ed10d2e06fe1fbcfea6952295214deb34d8962512b1d4a7519f78ca34d78efe7187e3aa82fc4a7af00d12- … and 193 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.36164×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.36121×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.36101×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.3696×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3671×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3666×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3646×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3642×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.3621×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.3617×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.3615×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux aarch64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.3613×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.369×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.367×DuckAssistBot/1.2; (+http://duckduckgo.com/duckassistbot.html)4×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.362×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.362×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.