t13d1517h2_8daaf6152771_4aacc9508e76
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d1517h2
handshake shape, human-readable
8daaf6152771
truncated hash of the cipher list
4aacc9508e76
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 15
- Extensions offered
- 17
- ALPN
- h2
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 15
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Extensions 17
-
51764 (0xca34) -
renegotiation_info -
17613 (0x44cd) -
supported_groups -
encrypted_client_hello -
key_share -
signature_algorithms -
session_ticket -
server_name -
signed_certificate_timestamp -
extended_master_secret -
supported_versions -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
status_request -
ec_point_formats -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
compress_certificate
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,51764-65281-17613-10-65037-51-13-35-0-18-23-43-16-5-11-45-27,4588-29-23-24,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 194
- First seen
- 2026-09-04 07:52 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-13 13:04 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 194
The same client, 194 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 194 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 194 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
b994dce5ee94c521a4d25c536bcd1c64f685fd14bf1608bc6e750437f62137daa2d6dc1eb7fa4bf4841abbb33b1482d4c2f0f0bd967bd96409e8aea0a28d70a391070ad401d7102fbf98d4117f28fa1b517b268071dac77535a39ad6ab0ed1c6b5545504de920d2e70d51f9b84681d38885bc363116d2f55b5985c3f5b2d53f00843b45e500440c06c90837c037134e9ee897f708a302cde6c59025626851091b722399d70a4f511fc1e25e32e5e196dca05d06a0a7b860a1fcb257d03748751- … and 182 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.36308×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.36103×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3696×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.3683×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.3671×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.3671×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/155.0.0.0 Safari/537.3652×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3648×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/155.0.0.0 Safari/537.3644×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.3625×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3625×PromptingBot/1.0.023×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/114.0.0.0 Safari/537.3618×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.3615×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3615×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.369×DuckAssistBot/1.2; (+http://duckduckgo.com/duckassistbot.html)2×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/83.0.4103.61 Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.