t13d1517h2_8daaf6152771_c14ab140e455
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d1517h2
handshake shape, human-readable
8daaf6152771
truncated hash of the cipher list
c14ab140e455
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 15
- Extensions offered
- 17
- ALPN
- h2
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 15
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Extensions 17
-
extended_master_secret -
supported_groups -
encrypted_client_hello -
status_request -
ec_point_formats -
signature_algorithms -
session_ticket -
17613 (0x44cd) -
supported_versions -
compress_certificate -
server_name -
renegotiation_info -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
key_share -
signed_certificate_timestamp -
51764 (0xca34) -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,23-10-65037-5-11-13-35-17613-43-27-0-65281-45-51-18-51764-16,4588-29-23-24,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 195
- First seen
- 2026-09-04 10:02 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-10 08:22 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 195
The same client, 195 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 195 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 195 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
db86ba1eb3e4007cacf4ead4ec9f7826ebd4d2b78783003ea73ddd42a9900e2277a8e3b2ab3d118cc93a14d81e8ab0d4c74ceeaf2d6ecc8ffcaeafd86d2882cc70983b5a0849c96216cd7e75a9a5b0e1a3b70aa033aefb1b7d4c425e5bd6aaa84733e4d2d9754bd35625008d5eb00f4aa5986f8244d2683516d7a8353bbd55973c602436a697ddea18492b69155f83ae761e91c52d486afa649b51bf831e9955a92525cfcaad76a738563eacdaa90d0e4725d4db5767f788d07029889671a891- … and 183 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.36215×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.36120×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.3686×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.3656×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/154.0.0.0 Safari/537.3653×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.3651×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3649×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.3648×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.3639×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/153.0.0.0 Safari/537.3628×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3618×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.3617×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/155.0.0.0 Safari/537.3611×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 OPR/136.0.0.09×Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 26_3_0 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) CriOS/144.0.7559.95 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.16×Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Qwantbot/1.0; +https://help.qwant.com/bot/)4×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/152.0.0.0 Safari/537.363×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/83.0.4103.61 Safari/537.361×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.