t13d1517h2_8daaf6152771_c80cf1d07396
Chrome — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13d1517h2
handshake shape, human-readable
8daaf6152771
truncated hash of the cipher list
c80cf1d07396
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- server name sent
- Cipher suites offered
- 15
- Extensions offered
- 17
- ALPN
- h2
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 15
-
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Extensions 17
-
encrypted_client_hello -
supported_versions -
signed_certificate_timestamp -
17613 (0x44cd) -
supported_groups -
renegotiation_info -
key_share -
status_request -
session_ticket -
server_name -
signature_algorithms -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
ec_point_formats -
compress_certificate -
extended_master_secret -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
pre_shared_key
Named groups 4
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,65037-43-18-17613-10-65281-51-5-35-0-13-16-11-27-23-45-41,4588-29-23-24,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 145
- First seen
- 2026-09-03 15:40 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-10 00:06 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 144
The same client, 144 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 144 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 144 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
cde7ebb4cff14d3cdaa9a4f2b89252339bb861e3c9648bc868ad6f5920c3cedbd29517a78b9fcccb1d08f861f81eed17a3c7d86f83312fdbc10266fa8662867054621fca83e2c16ed0806337ff8b7001b637ccd59b7398a90001e9db839850d4080a359404362747c041d489b53981145bae95592de2a558a0a6576007010ca9cf97626aeae1f547fb964082706537a6d9c90b5afb77222176fa44edffa08dbd52639beedcde3e71a5f75f40f9ba77a3744db09ca594c5f45130dc87978610dd- … and 132 more
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/138.0.0.0 Safari/537.36276×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/148.0.0.0 Safari/537.3639×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/132.0.0.0 Safari/537.3637×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/149.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.3614×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/124.0.0.0 Safari/537.3613×Sogou web spider/4.06×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/140.0.0.0 Safari/537.366×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/147.0.0.0 Safari/537.365×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/142.0.0.0 Safari/537.363×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/147.0.0.0 Safari/537.363×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/145.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/141.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/139.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 10; K) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/134.0.0.0 Mobile Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/148.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/148.0.0.01×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/135.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 5.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Mobile Safari/537.36 (compatible; TikTokSpider; ttspider-feedback@tiktok.com)1×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/133.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.